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Hegelian Priorities in Christendom:
A Reconsideration
Howard Kainz
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
Arguments from the nineteenth century concerning whether Hegel was
an atheist or a theist are still ongoing. This paper examines Hegel’s
philosophical and theological milieu, his influence on the history of philosophy
and on politics, his unique interpretation of the unity of theology and
philosophy, and his unusually sanguine interpretation of the relationship
between church and state, along with special problems he discerned in the
emergence of democracies.

In graduate courses I have taught on G. W. F. Hegel, I usually
start off soliciting opinions from students, to see if they have been
affected by any Hegelian prejudgements or stereotypes. The responses
I get are varied. Some may have heard of Hegel’s reputation for being
difficult or even incomprehensible; some may have come across
criticisms of Hegel’s alleged secularism or gnosticism by Leo Strauss,
Eric Voegelin, Karl Löwith, and others; those with a background in
Anglo-American analytic philosophy may have an image of Hegel as an
other-worldly idealist; or a student may have been exposed to some of
the nineteenth-century satirical plays about Hegel, such as Lindner’s
The Absolute Boot, with comical images of Germans trying to interpret
ordinary realities in sophisticated Hegelian fashion.
Such responses give me an opening for clarification. I try to
relieve anxieties about Hegel’s alleged incomprehensibility by pointing
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out, first of all, that rumors of Hegel’s difficulty are much exaggerated.
One avoidable obstacle to reading Hegel is his special technical
terminology: he uses terms like “concept,” “reason,” “abstract,”
“concrete,” “individual,” etc., in ways completely different from our
ordinary usage; thus I include glossaries in some of my books on
Hegel. Also, I point out, it is important to understand Hegel’s special
interpretation of the history of philosophy. According to Hegel, the
entire history of Western philosophy since Parmenides has been
concerned primarily with the relationship between thought and being,
and this concern has come to a head in modern philosophy after
Descartes’s famous “I think, therefore I am”—a new approach,
focusing on existence within subjectivity. The “Copernican revolution in
philosophy,” initiated by Kant, was the next logical step after
Descartes, beginning not with being, but with the structures of thought
(i.e., subjectivity). And the subsequent auseinandersetzung with Kant
is where we catch up with Hegel.
Kant famously argued that all traditional metaphysics,
concerned with ideas about God, cosmology, the human soul, and
freedom, was an invalid attempt to go beyond the limits of our
subjective powers of knowing; and ethics, according to Kant, had to be
based on purely subjective rational considerations—a “Categorical
Imperative” that requires us to test our personal moral maxims for
logical consistency, to see whether or not we individually could
consistently wish all humans to have the same maxims.
Hegel saw such Kantian challenges to traditional metaphysics
and ethics as problems that needed to be addressed. Thus he begins
his encyclopedic system of philosophy with a reestablished
metaphysics allegedly unassailable by the Kantian critique (the first
two-thirds of his “Logic”), and in his Phenomenology of Spirit
characterizes Kant’s ethics as a “nest of contradictions,” arguing that
an ethics of “pure rationality,” without indebtedness to natural
inclinations, is a Moralität prone to subjective distortions; that, in a
true ethics (Sittlichkeit), natural human inclinations are the necessary
springboard to a viable ethics; and furthermore, that the dialectic of
rights and duties in the individual conscience must be coordinated with
the incessant dialectic of rights and duties in society at large.
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Hegel’s Influence
The French existential phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty
(1908–1961), once observed that
Hegel is at the origin of everything important that has been
done in philosophy in the past century. . . . One could say
without paradox that giving an interpretation of Hegel is to take
a position on all the philosophical, political and religious
problems of our century.1
There are good grounds for this assertion. Even if Hegel was wrong on
many things, it is important to have some understanding of what he
was about—at least because of his influence on the history of
philosophy, and on history itself.
Karl Marx, for example, in his Postface to the second edition of
Capital, explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel: “When I
was working at the first volume of Capital . . . I openly avowed myself
the pupil of that mighty thinker.” Mark Meaney’s Capital as Organic
Unity: The Role of Hegel’s Science of Logic in Marx’s Grundrisse2
leaves us with the impression that Marx may have even had Hegel’s
Logic next to him on his desk, as he developed his theory of capital.
A similar indebtedness to Hegel characterizes a completely
different strand of nineteenth-century philosophy, from the Christian
existentialist Kierkegaard, who belatedly, and in spite of reservations
about Hegel’s treatment of individuality, declares:
His philosophical knowledge, his amazing learning, the insight of
his genius, and everything else good that can be said of a
philosopher I am willing to acknowledge as any disciple.— Yet,
no, not acknowledge—that is too distinguished an expression—
willing to admire, willing to learn from him.3
In the twentieth century, in Continental philosophy, phenomenologists,
existentialists and post-structuralists have attempted to take up where
Hegel left off: Heidegger lectured on Hegel’s Phenomenology, Sartre
critiqued Hegel’s theory of the relationship of en soi to pour soi in his
magisterial Being and Nothingness, and Derrida attempted to
“deconstruct” Hegel’s alleged “logocentrism” in Glas and other works.
Anglo-American philosophical currents were also affected; the reaction
against Hegelian idealism around the beginning of the twentieth
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century, led by Bertrand Russell, paved the way for analytic
philosophy, positivism and linguistic philosophy.
In politics, Hegel’s influence loomed large in the diverse and
incompatible arenas of communism, fascism, and democracy. Marx’s
explicit movement to communism had taken place with his 1843
commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, and Marx studied Hegel’s
works assiduously—especially (of all things!) Hegel’s Science of Logic;
Stalin, Lenin and Engels, following in Marx’s footsteps, wrote on
Hegelian logic, claiming to have discovered therein secrets of
“dialectic” which could be applied to the material and social world.
Peter Viereck in Metapolitics traces the influence of Hegelian
philosophers in Naziism, which took advantage of the Hegelian
emphasis on the “organic” nature of the state. But democratic political
philosophers such as Bosanquet, Oakeshott, and, more recently,
Fukuyama, have also found inspiration in Hegel’s idealistic construal of
liberalism.

New Initiatives in the Philosophy/Theology
Interface
Hegel’s initial career-objectives focused on becoming a Lutheran
pastor, as he entered the seminary at Tübingen. In his posthumouslypublished theological writings from that period,4 he indicates qualms
he had at this period about “positive religion” (that is, a Christianity
which compromised its spiritual moorings by focusing too much on
man-made rituals and doctrines), and he advocates recapturing the
“spirit of Christianity.” He contrasts the demeanor of Lutherans fearing
disease from other members of their congregation, as they take the
cup at the Lord’s Supper, with the spontaneous and joyful religious
rites of the ancient Greeks; and he asks rhetorically why Lutheran
bishops would still conduct the ritual of washing the feet of the
congregation as a sign of “service,” when in reality servants in the
modern world no longer perform such actions. He saw the essence of
Christianity as consisting in love—not as an abstract ideal, but as a
spirit consolidating a community and expanding naturally beyond the
bounds of the community even into the body politic. The main
“problematic” for Christianity, in Hegel’s eyes, had to do with
implementing the “Kingdom of God” spoken of in the Gospels.
Strongly influenced by the French and German Enlightenment,
Hegel was interested in overcoming the “myths” of religion, especially
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accounts of miracles. After graduation from the seminary at Tübingen,
like Thomas Jefferson, David Strauss, Ernest Renan, and others in that
era, he wrote a “Life of Jesus,”5 portraying Jesus as the founder of a
“virtue-religion,” and reinterpreting Jesus’ alleged “miracles.” After
working for some years as a private tutor, Hegel finally opted for a
career in philosophy. But to the end of his life, (once, in response to
someone’s complaint to authorities about Hegel’s bias against
Catholics), Hegel made frequent affirmations of his fidelity to
Lutheranism.
In his philosophy, he never left theology far behind. Like
Aquinas, it would be difficult to put Hegel into some neat “philosophy”
or “theology” category. It was partly because of this that theologian
Karl Barth has called Hegel “the Protestant Aquinas.”6 To be sure,
Hegel did not give much attention to Thomas Aquinas himself, in his
lectures on the history of medieval philosophy; nevertheless, in spite
of frequent criticisms of Roman Catholicism, he evinces grudging
admiration for Catholic theologians:
The philosophical or speculative element is much greater in
Catholic dogmatics. In the Protestant doctrinal system or in
Protestant dogmatics . . . the content is, on the contrary, more
historical in kind or more vested in a historical form, with the
result that the doctrine becomes arid. In the Catholic Church the
linkage of theology with philosophy has in substance always
been preserved.7
He then argues that the “modern principle” that the content of the
New Testament should be treated “with the methods of philological
and historical criticism” is “a perverse approach” in seeking the truth
of the Christian religion.8 And he supports a position that now may
seem a bit extreme: namely, that “theology continues to be through
and through the same thing as philosophy and it cannot separate itself
from philosophy.”9 However, there are theologians who consider this
an approach worth cultivating. Hans Küng, for instance, in his The
Incarnation of God, expands on Hegel’s philosophical/theological
interpretation of the Incarnation, and Cyril O’Regan in The Heterodox
Hegel offers a largely sympathetic excursus on Hegel’s multiple
philosophical investigations of traditional Christian doctrines.
But as Hegel began working out his “System” toward the onset
of the nineteenth century, the traditional Scholastic view of philosophy
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as the “handmaiden of theology” was inverted—not in the sense that
theology became subordinate to philosophy, but in so far as theology
became an indispensable impetus to philosophy. As mentioned above,
Hegel viewed the history of philosophy in terms of successive attempts
to bring together being and thought—a goal that (as Hegel interprets
it) has also been the earmark of religion, and has been achieved most
successfully in the Christian religion. In modern philosophy, according
to Hegel, approximations to that same goal had also, providentially,
been made; and Hegel saw his own vocation as a philosopher in
furthering (or even completing) this process through a systematic
speculation on the truths of the Christian faith. Concrete traditional
Christian doctrines provide for the philosopher Vorstellungen,“picturethoughts” which need to be explored conceptually for philosophical
truths. “Speculation,” it should be emphasized, had no pejorative
connotation for Hegel, as it often does now; and the process of
speculating on Christian doctrines is a keynote of all his major works.
Thus Hegel characterizes his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit as
an intellectual passion-play, a reenactment of the “Golgotha of the
human spirit,”10 tracing the philosophical quest for an “absolute”
standpoint beyond the dichotomies and alienations of realism,
idealism, and other “-isms.” Toward the end of this work, this
“absolute” standpoint is charted by Hegel as finally emerging in the
aftermath of a journey passing through ancient “nature-religion” and
Hellenic “art-religion” to Christianity, the “absolute religion.” He
focuses on the Virgin Birth as symbolizing the universal experience of
individual self-consciousness uniting with the divine substance.11
Hegel’s later works are a continuation of the same overall
philosophical/theological project. He describes his Science of Logic as a
speculative investigation of “the life of God before the creation of the
world”,12 nature, in his Philosophy of Nature, is the external son of god
(“the son of God, but not as the Son, but as abiding in otherness—the
divine Idea as held fast for a moment outside the divine love”13);
political philosophy is the investigation of the “march of God”
in the progressive development of human society.14 His Lectures on
the Philosophy of Religion, published posthumously in three volumes,
are credited with establishing the Philosophy of Religion as a distinct
and mainstream area of scholarship. And at the outset of his
posthumously-published Lectures on the Philosophy of History, he
criticizes theologians who give mere pious affirmations of Divine
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Providence, without trying to show its workings in the real world.
Hegel then gives a particularly clear indication to his students of his
own theological/philosophical approach:
God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for his
children; but those whose spirit is of itself indeed, poor, but rich
in the knowledge of Him; and who regard this knowledge of God
as the only valuable possession. . . . It was for awhile the
fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of God, as
displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But, if it
be allowed that Providence manifests itself in such objects and
forms of existence, why not also in Universal History? . . . Our
mode of treating the subject is . . . a Theodicaea—a justification
of the ways of God.15
Hegel then goes on in his lectures on history, starting with China
and other ancient civilizations, then through Greek and Roman and
Germanic history, developing his thesis that the ineluctable flow of the
human spirit has been away from hegemonies in which one man was
free, then to aristocracies and oligarchies in which an elite group or
groups attained freedom, and finally to the modern concept of a free
society, whose ultimate quest is for all humans to be free16 (this is the
insight which gave rise, with considerable modifications, to Francis
Fukuyama’s 1992 interpretation of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
The End of History and the Last Man).
As Cyril O’Regan and others have noted, Hegel harbored a
special admiration for the theology of the German mystic, Jacob
Boehme, who is famous for attempting to systematically portray the
workings of the Holy Trinity in creation, throughout nature, and in the
workings of the human spirit. One instance of Hegel’s admiration for
this Trinitarian methodology is his characterization of “triplicity” as the
“absolute method”—not in terms of (the frequently-heard Hegelstereotype) “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” terminology used by Hegel’s
contemporary, Fichte—but in the conceptual analysis of movements
from “in-itself, for-itself, in-and-for-itself,” “universal, particular,
individual,” and other triads. Hegel’s Trinitarian interest became most
evident in his treatise on the proofs for the existence of God, when,
after criticizing the “ontological proofs” which attempt to establish
God’s existence from the concept of a “being than whom nothing
greater can be thought,” he develops his own Trinitarian version of the
proof, as Patricia Calton shows in Hegel’s Metaphysics of God: The
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Ontological Proof as the Development of a Trinitarian Divine Ontology.
There is a legend that St. Augustine, meditating on the Trinity while
walking along the seashore, was warned by an angel that he would
never be able to comprehend the mystery. In contrast, Hegel was
optimistic about finding rich philosophical meaning in that doctrine.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Hegel, who in his
seminary days, thought it necessary to get beyond the “positive”
trappings of doctrine and ritual in orthodox Lutheranism, found the
proper vocation of the theologian to consist in philosophical
contemplation as the highest and most mature type of religious
worship:
The inwardness of the heart’s worship and our pictorial thinking
is not the highest form of inwardness. As this purest form of
knowledge we must recognize untrammeled thinking in which
philosophy brings to our minds the same content [as in religion]
and thereby attains that most spiritual worship in which thinking
makes its own and knows conceptually what otherwise is only
the content of subjective feeling or pictorial thinking.17

Church and State
The early interest of Hegel in the Christian belief in the Kingdom
of God did not flag after his seminary days, but continued and even
broadened. As I have brought out in my 1993 book Democracy and
the “Kingdom of God”, the majority of theologians today consider the
“Kingdom of God” to be the most important “symbol” of the Gospels,
although there have been ongoing disputes about the interpretation of
the Kingdom in terms of its presence now vs. its relegation to a
hereafter.18 Is the Church the Kingdom of God already present in the
world, as Augustine and other patristic theologians thought? Or is the
Kingdom to be attained only with the second coming of Christ? or only
in the next world? Hegel in great measure agreed with Augustine,
observing in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that, “the
church is the kingdom of God, the achieved presence, life,
preservation, and enjoyment of the Spirit.”19 But this kingdom, in
Hegel’s view, will necessarily spill over into the community at large
and validate the worldly realm.
When the Kingdom of God has won a place in the world and is
active in penetrating worldly aims and interests and therefore in
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transfiguring them, when father, mother, brother, meet in the
community, then the worldly realm too for its part begins to
claim and assert its right to validity.20
As mentioned above, with reference to Hegel’s philosophy of history,
all of history is interpreted by Hegel as an evolution to greater and
greater subjective freedom, leading in the modern world to the
emergence of the “free state.” Roman Catholicism, in Hegel’s view,
had been for Christians an impediment in the achievement of this goal,
because of the dichotomies which it allegedly perpetuated between
priesthood and layperson, the spirit and the flesh, the Church and the
world. But Lutheranism is extolled by Hegel as the champion of the
true Christian spirit, finally bringing about the resolution of such
dichotomies. For example, Hegel offers the following contrast of the
historically emerging Lutheran spirit with the three vows of poverty,
chastity and obedience, which were central to Catholic religious
orders:
Once the divine spirit introduces itself into reality, and reality
emancipates itself to spirit, then what in the world was a
postulate of holiness is supplanted by the reality of moral life.
Instead of the vow of chastity, marriage now ranks as the
ethical relation; and, therefore, as the highest on this side of
humanity stands the family. Instead of the vow of poverty
(muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to
whosoever gives away goods to the poor, i.e. whosoever
enriches them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through
one’s own intelligence and industry,—of honesty in commercial
dealing, and in the use of property—in short, moral life in the
socio-economic sphere. And instead of the vow of obedience,
true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal
arrangements of the state—an obedience which is itself the true
freedom, because the state is self-possessed, self-realizing
reason—in short, moral life in the state. Thus, and thus only,
can law and morality exist.21
In other words, the Protestant Reformation had laid the foundation for
the universal attainment of freedom in and with the secular realm:
In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as
their several applications, embody the principle and the
development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only
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proceed from the truth of religion, when reinstated in its original
principle and in that way as such first become actual. The moral
life of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus
reciprocal guarantees of strength.22
The Protestantism that Hegel had in mind was the extremely
community-oriented Lutheranism prominent at that time in Germany;
and Hegel was optimistic about the close and mutually constructive
relationship between state and church that would result:
The state discharges a duty by affording every assistance and
protection to the church in the furtherance of its religious ends;
and, in addition, since religion is an integrating factor in the
state, implanting a sense of unity in the depths of men’s minds,
the state should even require [!] all its citizens to belong to a
church—a church is all that can be said, because since the
content of a man’s faith depends on his private ideas, the state
cannot interfere with it.23
In retrospect, we can see that the political problematic that Hegel was
dealing with contrasts remarkably with the problematic we are most
conscious of—not the separation of church and state, but the
harmonious union and cooperation between church and state, between
the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world—already achieved
in principle through the breakthroughs of Protestant Christianity, which
has “rolled up its sleeves” and worked to transform the world, rather
than escape from it or dictate to it (Hegel’s stereotype of medieval
Catholicism). Such an ideal will seem idyllic to Americans, influenced
by a constitutional bill of rights which evinces intense consciousness of
the dangers of a too-close relationship between church and state. On
the other hand, it may be worthwhile to contemplate what might be
the result if those standing on each side of the proverbial “wall of
separation between state and church” were able to aggressively and
systematically cultivate areas of mutual cooperation.

Democracy, Reconsidered
Hegel, although a serious apologist for a “free modern state,”
was no fan of democracy. Political philosophers from within
democracy, such as John Stuart Mill, have warned about the possibility
of a “tyranny of the majority” which always has the potential to
subjugate or endanger minorities in any established democracy.
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Hegel’s qualms about democracy were somewhat similar. In a
democracy, Hegel saw the ever-present possibility of the
“preponderating majority of freemen,” after having attained their goal
of participation in the sovereignty of the state, basing their influence
“on the principle of multeity or mere numbers.” But even this, in
Hegel’s view, was not the major weakness with democracies. Hegel’s
primary reservations about democracy stemmed from his metaphysics,
which envisioned an “organic” union of “nature” and “spirit” in politics,
as in other areas. In other words, a successful political constitution, as
Hegel conceptualized it, would be one which is based on the natural
associations or groupings which have developed historically in a
society, and which are able to be elevated to a higher “spiritual” unity,
ideally operating after the pattern of an organism (this notion of a
“political organism,” of course, was the aspect that Hitler’s
philosophers latched onto, and exploited for their own purposes). One
of Hegel’s counter-examples of the failure to coordinate nature and
spirit was Napoleon’s attempt to impose a well-thought-out, liberal
constitution per impossibile on Spain.
To be sure, there was a paucity of democratic states in the early
nineteenth century that could serve Hegel as models. The historic
eighteenth-century political maneuvers of non-native, motley groups
of European immigrants in America must have seemed to Hegel like an
overly cerebral attempt, with insufficient grounding in nature and
historical precedents, to “invent” a constitutional government (to use
Garry Wills’s terminology). Also objectionable was the “one man, one
vote” principle, which is foundational in democracies, and which seems
to utilize a purely quantitative criterion for participation in
government. In Hegel’s view, such a government offered an example
par excellence of a mathematically conditioned, and thus inorganic
political society.
Hegel has been unjustly criticized as idealizing an extant
Prussian monarchical form of government. Hegel’s ideal government
was indeed monarchical; but the model which seemed uppermost in
his mind was the British style of limited monarchy, in which the
monarch would be largely limited to “dotting the i’s and crossing the
t’s” in a parliamentary government. The type of representation that
Hegel opted for—trade organizations, churches, educational
institutions, and other “corporations” sending representatives to
parliament—did not prevail in the Prussia of his time. In other words,
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Hegel’s political philosophy was a reformist ideal, in the context of the
then-prevailing Prussian hegemony.
If it be granted to Hegel that giving “natural groupings”
adequate representation in government might be a healthy
development, and if we look for any promising developments of that
sort in current American politics, our attention might turn to lobbies
and lobbyists as a “natural” ground-swell influencing our government
(going well beyond Hegel’s concept of “corporations,” however). But
more precisely—with the exception of Common Cause as a “citizen’s
lobby”—we might see most of these power brokers as an oligarchic,
rather than a democratic, type of input.
Not infrequently in our pragmatically-oriented culture, people
ask (or wonder) about the usefulness of philosophy. Hegel’s response
to that challenge is paradoxical: the primary “useful” contribution of
philosophy is the progressive enhancement of the self-consciousness
of mankind. Like Socrates, the “father of Western philosophy,” Hegel
saw his vocation as the investigation of the “big” questions—what is
the best form of government? the relationship between faith and
knowledge? the best way to coordinate religion and politics? As we
look into the nuances connected with these questions, we sometimes
encounter some useful “practical” insights. This is not the goal of our
investigation, however, but an occasional welcome side-effect.
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